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To advance understanding of the relationship between entrepreneurship and the informal sector, the 
aim of this paper is to evaluate and explain variations in the extent to which formal enterprises witness 
competition from unregistered or informal enterprises across Latin American & Caribbean countries. 
Reporting World Bank Enterprise Survey (WBES) data on 31 Latin American and Caribbean 
countries, this reveals that two-thirds (65.5 per cent) of formal enterprises witness competition from 
informal sector enterprise. To explain the cross-country variations, four competing theories are 
evaluated which variously view the prevalence of the informal sector to be determined by either: 
economic under-development (modernization theory); high taxes and state over-interference (neo-
liberal theory); too little state intervention (political economy theory), or an asymmetry between the 
laws and regulations of formal institutions and the unwritten socially shared rules of informal 
institutions (institutional theory). A probit regression analysis confirms the modernization, political 
economy and institutional theories, but not neo-liberal theory. Beyond economic under-development, 
therefore, it is too little state intervention and whether the laws and regulations developed by 
governments are in symmetry with the norms, values and beliefs of entrepreneurs. The paper 
concludes by discussing the theoretical and policy implications of these findings.  
Keywords: entrepreneurship; informal sector; economic development; development economics; Latin 
American & Caribbean. 
 
1.   Introduction 
Do formal enterprises witness competition from informal sector enterprises? And why is 
informal sector competition more common in some countries than others? Finding answers 
to these questions is important. It is now known that informal sector enterprises which do 
not register with, and/or declare some or all production and/or sales to, the authorities for 
tax, benefit and/or labour law purposes when they should do so (Ketchen et al., 2014; 
Siqueira et al., 2016; Williams et al., 2017), are a common feature across the global 
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economy. Throughout the world, two-thirds of all enterprises are unregistered at start-up 
(Autio and Fu, 2015), over a half of all current enterprises operate unregistered (Acs et al., 
2013), and if the un-estimated number of formal enterprises under-reporting sales is 
included, an even higher proportion can be designated as operating in the informal sector 
(Williams, 2018).  
Reviewing the literature, four rival theories have been used to explain the varying 
prevalence of unfair competition from informal sector enterprises. Firstly, modernization 
theory has contested that informal sector competitors are more prevalent when there is 
economic under-development (La Porta and Schleifer, 2014), secondly, neo-liberal theory 
has argued that the level of informal sector competition is higher when there are high taxes 
and too much state interference (De Soto, 2001). Thirdly, and conversely, political 
economy theory views higher informal competition as resulting from inadequate state 
intervention (Castells and Portes, 1989), and fourth and finally, institutional theory depicts 
informal competition to be more common when the laws and regulations of formal 
institutions are not in symmetry with the unwritten socially shared rules of informal 
institutions (Windebank and Horodnic, 2017; Webb et al., 2009, 2013, 2014). The aim of 
this paper is to evaluate these rival explanations for the variations across countries in the 
prevalence of informal sector competition.  
To commence, section 2 reviews the rival theories explaining the variations in the 
prevalence of informal sector competition. The outcome will be a set of propositions that 
can be evaluated. Section 3 then reports the data, variables and methods used to test these 
propositions, namely a probit regression analysis of World Bank Enterprise Survey 
(WBES) on Latin American & Caribbean countries, followed in section 4 by the findings. 
Section 5 then concludes by discussing the theoretical and policy implications along with 
the limitations of the current research and future research required.  
The outcome will be to advance scholarship on the relationship between the informal 
sector and entrepreneurship in three ways. Theoretically, this paper advances explanations 
for the varying prevalence of informal sector competition. In stark contrast to current 
debates that adopt one or other theoretical perspective, this paper will tentatively show 
there is a need to synthesize the modernization, political economy and institutional theories 
to more fully understand the cross-country variations in the prevalence of informal sector 
competition. Empirically, meanwhile, this paper reports for the first time the cross-country 
variations in the prevalence of informal sector competition across Latin America and 
Caribbean countries. Third and finally, and from the perspective of policy, the practical 
contribution is to show the need for a shift in policy approach when tackling informal sector 
entrepreneurship and enterprises. 
   
2.   Explaining Informal Sector Competition: theories and hypotheses 
Over the past decade, a new sub-field of entrepreneurship scholarship has emerged that 
focuses upon understanding and explaining the relationship between entrepreneurship and 
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the informal sector (Aidis et al., 2006; Bureau and Fendt, 2011; Coletto and Bisschop, 
2017; Kus, 2014; Mróz, 2012; Ram et al., 2017; Webb et al., 2009, 2013; Williams, 2018). 
This new sub-field has variously studied who participates in informal sector 
entrepreneurship (Thai and Turkina, 2014; Williams and Martinez-Perez, 2014) and 
whether they are necessity- and/or opportunity-driven (Adom and Williams, 2014; 
Maloney, 2004; Perry and Maloney, 2007), its variable prevalence (Autio and Fu, 2015; 
Williams and Kedir 2016, 2017a) and how this can be explained (Dau and Cuervo-Cazurra, 
2014; Siqueira et al,. 2016). Here, firstly, the emergent scholarship on the prevalence of 
entrepreneurship in the informal sector is briefly reviewed and secondly, the rival theories 
that explain cross-country variations in its prevalence. 
 
2.1.   Commonality of informal sector competition 
A range of studies have estimated the prevalence of entrepreneurship in the informal sector 
in specific countries (e.g., Chepurenko, 2016; Godfrey and Dyer, 2015; London et al., 
2014; Williams et al., 2016; Yu and Bruton, 2015). There are also a range of small cross-
country studies of its prevalence. For example, comparing England, Russia and Ukraine, 
Williams (2008) finds that 23 per cent, 96 per cent and 51 per cent of entrepreneurs operate 
in the informal sector respectively. This study, nevertheless, is based on a survey of just 
130 entrepreneurs in England, 331 in Ukraine and 81 in Moscow. 
 To provide a more comprehensive analysis of the cross-country variations, three data 
sets are available. Firstly, there is an International Labour Organization (ILO) dataset (ILO, 
2011, 2012). Analyzing 38 countries, Williams (2018) reveals that 16.6 percent of the non-
agricultural workforce engage in entrepreneurship in the informal sector as their main job. 
When those employed by these informal entrepreneurs are included, 31.5 per cent of the 
workforce in these 38 countries are either informal entrepreneurs or have their main job in 
informal enterprises. However, this varies from 38.8 per cent in sub-Saharan Africa to 20.6 
per cent in Europe and Central Asia. In 16 (42 per cent) of the 38 countries, informal 
enterprises employ the majority of the (non-agricultural) labour force. Entrepreneurs 
operating in the informal sector, and the employment they create, in consequence, is not a 
minor aspect of these economies. However, marked cross-country variations exist in the 
share of the non-agricultural workforce with their main job in informal enterprises either 
as informal entrepreneurs or waged employees. This ranges from 73 per cent in Pakistan 
and 71.4 per cent in Mali through to 7.0 per cent in Moldova and 3.5 per cent in Serbia.   
 Secondly, the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) can be analyzed. Examining 
51 countries, Dau and Cuervo-Cazurra (2014) reveal that 3.37 informal enterprises are 
created annually for every 100 people. Using a similar measure, Autio and Fu (2015) find 
that two-thirds of enterprises start-up unregistered in emerging and transition economies 
(where 0.62 informal enterprises compared with 0.37 formal enterprises are created 
annually for every 100 people) as well as in OECD countries (where 0.62 informal 
enterprises compared with 0.43 formal enterprises are created annually for every 100 
people). These studies derive such estimates by subtracting World Bank estimates of the 
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number of registered businesses from the GEM estimates of the total number of new 
enterprises in each country. Such estimates, therefore, must be viewed as tentative.  
 Third and finally, there is the World Bank Enterprise Survey (WBES). This collects 
data on whether formal enterprises started-up unregistered and whether they compete with 
the informal sector and if informal sector competition constrains their operations. Until 
now, this data-set has been rarely used when studying the relationship between 
entrepreneurship and the informal sector. One exception is a study of whether formal 
businesses started-up unregistered (Williams et al., 2017), but this does not analyses the 
reasons for the cross-country variations. Williams and Kedir (2018a) do so and reveal the 
importance of the modernization, political economy and institutional theories in explaining 
cross-country variations. Meanwhile, the WBES data on whether formal sector enterprises 
witness informal sector competition has been subject to little or no analysis. This dataset 
therefore represents an untapped resource.  
 
2.2.   Theorizations of the variable commonality of informal sector competition  
Turning to rival theories for the cross-country variations in the prevalence of informal 
sector entrepreneurship, four competing explanations exist. These explain greater levels of 
informal entrepreneurship to result from either: economic under-development 
(modernization theory); high taxes and state over-interference (neo-liberal theory); 
inadequate state intervention (political economy theory), or the asymmetry between the 
laws and regulations of formal institutions and the unwritten socially shared rules of 
informal institutions (institutionalist theory). 
 Most studies explaining informal sector entrepreneurship have done so using just one 
or other of these rival theories, such as modernization theory (e.g., La Porta and Shleifer, 
2008, 2014), neo-liberal theory (e.g., De Soto, 1989), political economy theory (e.g., 
Castells and Portes, 1989; Davis, 2006; Slavnic, 2010), or institutional theory (e.g., Webb 
et al., 2009). Recently, however, scholarship has emerged that asserts how these are not 
mutually exclusive theories. Analyzing the bivariate correlations between the structural 
conditions deemed important in each theory and the scale of the informal sector across the 
European Union (Williams, 2014a,b; Williams and Windebank, 2015), Central and Eastern 
Europe (Williams, 2015a,c), Latin America (Williams and Youssef, 2013, 2014) and the 
wider developing world (Williams, 2015b,d), the modernization, political economy and 
institutional theories have been confirmed and neo-liberal theory refuted. Multivariate 
regression analyses at the level of Central and Eastern Europe (Williams and Horodnic, 
2015a), the Baltics (Williams and Horodnic, 2015b,c) and South-East Europe (Williams 
and Horodnic, 2015d) have reached the same conclusion. These studies, nevertheless, 
evaluate these theories in relation to the size of the informal sector, rather than the level of 
entrepreneurship in the informal sector. 
 There have also been studies evaluating these rival explanations for the cross-country 
variations in the prevalence of informal sector entrepreneurship. Using bivariate 
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correlations, these again confirm the modernization, political economy and institutional 
theories but not neo-liberal theory (Williams, 2014c,d). Multivariate regression analyses 
conducted, albeit confined to the European Union and only examining either the tendency 
of small businesses to pay their formal employees an additional undeclared (envelope) 
wage (Williams and Horodnic, 2016) or whether the self-employed conduct some of their 
transactions in the informal sector (Williams and Martinez-Perez, 2014), again conclude 
the same as the above studies.  
 Studies evaluating the varying level informal sector competition across countries have 
so far been confined to a study of 142 countries which again reveals the same finding that 
modernization, political economy and institutional theories apply but not neo-liberal theory 
(Williams and Kedir, 2018a), and a study of three South-Eastern European countries which 
shows that informal sector competition leads to poorer firm performance (Williams and 
Bezeredi, 2018b). To further advance understanding of the prevalence of informal sector 
competition, this paper will focus upon Latin America and the Caribbean countries to 
evaluate which, if any, of these theories are valid in this global region. To do so, each 
theory is now briefly reviewed to formulate hypotheses that can be tested. 
 Modernization theory, which dominated how the informal sector was conceptualized 
during the twentieth century, holds that the modern formal sector is becoming hegemonic 
and the informal sector fading from view. Informal enterprises, such as street hawkers, are 
portrayed as a leftover from an earlier pre-modern system of production and in demise. The 
persistence of informal and unregistered enterprises thus displays tKH OHYHO RI ³XQGHU-
GHYHORSPHQW´RIDFRXQWU\*HHUW], 1963; Gilbert, 1998; Lewis, 1959). Formal enterprises 
are therefore more likely to witness informal sector competition in less economically 
developed countries, measured in terms of GDP per capita, and in countries where 
household consumption expenditure per capita is lower (ILO, 2012). The following 
hypothesis can be therefore tested: 
 
Modernization hypothesis (H1): Formal enterprises are more likely to witness 
informal sector competition in less developed Latin American and Caribbean 
economies. 
H1a: Formal enterprises are more likely to witness informal sector competition in 
less developed Latin American and Caribbean economies, measured in terms of 
GDP per capita. 
H1b: Formal enterprises are more likely to witness informal sector competition in 
less developed Latin American and Caribbean economies, measured in terms of 
household consumption expenditure per capita. 
 
Neo-liberal theory, meanwhile, asserts that informal and unregistered enterprise prevails 
due to high taxes and too much state interference in the market, which leads entrepreneurs 
to make the rational economic decision to exit the formal sector to avoid the costs, time 
and effort of operating formally (e.g., London and Hart, 2004; Nwabuzor, 2005; Small 
Business Council, 2004). For such neo-liberals, the informal sector arises due to 
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entrepreneurs being constrained by high taxes and state-imposed institutional constraints 
(De Soto, 1989, 2001; Perry and Maloney, 2007). In consequence, formal enterprises will 
be more likely to witness informal sector competitors in countries with higher taxes and 
greater state interference. To evaluate this neo-liberal explanation, the following 
hypothesis can be tested: 
 
Neo-liberal hypothesis (H2): Formal enterprises are more likely to witness informal 
sector competition in countries with higher tax rates, and higher levels of state 
interference in the free market. 
H2a: Formal enterprises are more likely to witness informal sector competition in 
Informal sector competition in countries with higher tax rates, measured by the tax 
revenue to GDP ratio. 
H2b: Formal enterprises are more likely to witness informal sector competition in 
countries where state interference is greater, measured by the expense of 
government as a percentage of GDP. 
 
In political economy theory, the informal sector is caused by an increasingly de-regulated 
open world economy in which outsourcing and subcontracting are used to bring informal 
entrepreneurship into contemporary capitalism, resulting in downward pressures on wages 
as well as incomes, welfare services and benefits (Aliyev, 2015; Dibben and Williams, 
2012; Dibben et al., 2015; Harriss-White, 2014; Meagher, 2010; Portes, 1994). Such 
endeavor is seen as unregulated, precarious and low paid survival-driven activity 
conducted by those excluded from the formal labour market and unprotected by social 
protection systems; they are necessity-driven entrepreneurs (Castells and Portes 1989; 
Gallin, 2001; Sassen, 1996; Taiwo, 2013). As such, formal enterprises will be more likely 
to witness informal sector competition in countries with inadequate state intervention 
(Davis, 2006; Slavnic, 2010). To evaluate this political economy explanation, therefore, 
the following hypothesis can be tested: 
 
Political economy hypothesis (H3): Formal enterprises are more likely to witness 
informal sector competition in countries with lower levels of state intervention. 
H3a: Formal enterprises are more likely to witness informal sector competition in 
countries with lower tax to GDP ratios. 
H3b: Formal enterprises are more likely to witness informal sector competition in 
countries where the expense of government as a percentage of GDP is lower. 
 
For those adopting institutional theory, all the above theories do not explain why some 
entrepreneurs in a country engage in the informal sector and others do not. Institutional 
theorists have started to answer this (Baumol and Blinder, 2008; North, 1990). Institutions 
are the rules of the game that govern and prescribe behavior, and all societies possess on 
the one hand, formal institutions (i.e., laws and regulations) that set out the legal rules of 
the game, and on the other hand, informal institutions which are the unwritten socially 
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shared rules that exist outside of officially sanctioned channels (Helmke and Levitsky, 
2004), and are expressed in norms, values and beliefs regarding what is right and 
acceptable (Denzau and North 1994). Formal sector entrepreneurship therefore takes place 
within the formal institutional prescriptions of the codified laws and regulations, whilst 
informal entrepreneurship takes place outside of formal institutional prescriptions but 
within the norms, values and beliefs of informal institutions (Godfrey, 2011; Kistruck et 
al., 2015; Siqueira et al., 2016; Webb et al., 2009, 2013, 2014; Welter et al., 2015; Williams 
and Bezeredi, 2018a; Williams and Gurtoo, 2017; Williams and Krasniqi, 2018).  
 For such institutional theorists, cross-country variations in the prevalence of informal 
sector enterprise result from the asymmetry between the laws and regulations of formal 
institutions and the norms, values and beliefs of informal institutions (Dau and Cuervo-
Cazurra, 2014; Godfrey, 2015; Sutter et al., 2017; Thai and Turkina, 2014; Vu, 2014; Webb 
and Ireland, 2015; Williams and Shahid, 2016; Williams et al., 2017). The assertion is that 
the greater the degree of non-alignment between formal and informal institutions, the 
higher is the likelihood that formal sector enterprises will witness informal sector 
competition (Williams and Kedir, 2018a,b). To test institutional theory, therefore, proxy 
indicators of the level of institutional asymmetry are required. One such proxy indicator is 
the level of trust iQIRUPDOLQVWLWXWLRQVVLQFHWKHOHYHORIVXFK³YHUWLFDO WUXVW´LVDGLUHFW
proxy of the level asymmetry between informal and formal institutions. Another proxy 
indicator is the perceived level of public sector corruption. When corruption is perceived 
to predominate, the greater is the level of institutional symmetry (Torgler, 2012). To 
evaluate institutional theory, therefore, the following hypothesis can be tested: 
 
Institutional asymmetry hypothesis (H4): Formal enterprises are more likely to 
witness informal sector competition in countries where there is greater asymmetry 
between formal and informal institutions. 
H4a: Formal enterprises are more likely to witness informal sector competition in 
countries where there is greater asymmetry between formal and informal 
institutions, measured in terms of trust in state institutions. 
H4b: Formal enterprises are more likely to witness informal sector competition in 
countries where there is greater asymmetry between formal and informal 
institutions, measured in terms of the level of public sector corruption. 
 
3.   Data, Variables and Methods 
3.1.   Data 
To evaluate the rival theories that variously explain the varying prevalence of informal 
sector competition, World Bank Enterprise Survey (WBES) data on 31 Latin American & 
Caribbean countries is here reported. Table 1 outlines the Latin American and Caribbean 
countries covered in this survey. 
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Table 1. Latin American & Caribbean countries list in the WEBS 
Country  Survey year Country  Survey year 
Antigua & Barbuda 2010 Guyana 2010 
Argentina 2006,2010 Honduras 2006,2010 
Bahamas 2010 Jamaica 2010 
Barbados 2010 Mexico 2006,2010 
Belize 2010 Nicaragua 2006,2010 
Bolivia 2006,2010 Panama 2006,2010 
Brazil 2009 Paraguay 2006,2010 
Chile 2006,2010 Peru 2006,2010 
Colombia 2006,2010 St Kitts and Nevis 2010 
Costa Rica 2010 St Lucia 2010 
Dominica 2010 St Vincent & the Grenadines 2010 
Dominican Republic 2010 Suriname 2010 
Ecuador 2006,2010 Trinidad & Tobago 2010 
El Salvador 2006,2010 Uruguay 2006,2010 
Grenada 2010 Venezuela 2006,2010 
Guatemala 2006,2010   
 
 
In each of these countries, the WBES collects data from non-agricultural formal private 
sector businesses with five or more employees using a stratified random sample. The 
sample is stratified by firm size, business sector and geographic region. The firm size strata 
in the WBES are 5-19 (small), 20-99 (medium), and 100+ employees (large-sized firms), 
while sector is broken down into manufacturing, services, transportation and construction. 
Public utilities, government services, health care, and financial services sectors are 
excluded, and in larger economies, manufacturing sub-sectors are used as additional strata 
based on employment, value-added, and total number of establishments. Geographical 
regions within a country are stratified based on the cities/regions collectively containing 
the majority of economic activity. The sampling frame is derived from the universe of 
HOLJLEOH ILUPV QRUPDOO\ REWDLQHG IURP WKH FRXQWU\¶V VWDWLVWLFDO RIILFH RU DQRWKHU
government agency such as the tax or business licensing authorities. Since 2006, all 
national surveys explain the source of the sample frame.  
The sample here is restricted to Latin American & Caribbean countries surveyed from 
2006 to 2010, which have used the harmonized questionnaire and common sampling 
methodology, assuring that data is comparable across countries and over time.  
 
3.2.   Dependent variable   
 
Past cross-country studies of informal entrepreneurship and enterprise have analyzed either 
the percentage of unregistered enterprises in a country or the percentage of formal 
enterprises that started-up unregistered (Dau and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2014; Kistruck et al., 
2014; Siqueira et al. 2014; Thai and Turkina, 2014; Williams et al., 2017). Such measures 
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exclude formal enterprises that under-report a portion of their sales. Neither are these 
measures informative of whether these informal sector enterprises have a deleterious 
impact on the operation of formal enterprises. Here, therefore, to measure more fully the 
prevalence of informal sector entrepreneurship on formal entrepreneurship and enterprises, 
an analysis is undertaken of whether formal enterprises report that they witness informal 
sector competition. To do so, a WBES question is used that examines responses to the 
question, ³'RHVWKLVHVWDEOLVKPHQWFRPSHWHDJDLQVWXQUHJLVWHUHGRILQIRUPDOILUPV"yes, 
nR´7KLVLVDGXPP\YDULDEOHZLWKDYDOXHRILIIRUPDOHQWHUSULVHVGHFODUH<HVDQGD
value of 0 otherwise.  
 
3.3.   Key independent variables  
To test the various theories that variously explain cross-country variations in the prevalence 
of informal sector competition, firm-level variables are used as controls and country-level 
variables that capture the tenets of the modernization, neo-liberal, political economy and 
institutional perspectives.  
 To analyses hypotheses H1-H4 regarding the key determinants, while holding constant 
the firm-level control variables, variables are employed that have been used in previous 
studies evaluating these hypotheses in relation to the informal sector (discussed in the 
previous section). To evaluate the modernization hypothesis (H1), the indicators used are: 
x the current GDP per capita expressed in purchasing power parity in international 
dollars terms, transformed into natural logs. The IMF World Economic Outlook Database 
for the relevant year in which the survey was conducted in each country was used.  
x Household consumption expenditure per capita, retrieved from the same source in the 
same manner, also transformed into natural logs. 
Meanwhile, to test both neo-liberal theory (H2) and political economy theory (H3) that too 
much or too little state interference increases informal sector competition respectively, two 
indicators of the level of state intervention are employed, namely:   
x Tax revenue to GDP ratio, from the IMF World Economic Outlook database. 
x Expense of government as a % of GDP, which measures the size of government and 
is therefore a proxy of the level of state intervention. The expense of government is the 
level of cash payments for the operating activities of government in providing goods and 
services. It includes compensation of employees (e.g., wages and salaries), interest and 
subsidies, grants, social benefits, and other expenses such as rent and dividends, data from 
the IMF World Economic Outlook database. 
To test institutional theory (H4), two proxy indicators of the level of asymmetry between 
the formal and informal institutions are used, namely:  
x Trust in the court system, measured by the percentage of firms believing that the court 
system is fair, impartial and uncorrupted. This is based on the response to the following 
TXHVWLRQ³, am going to read some statements that describe the courts system and how 
it could affect business. For each statement, please tell me if you strongly disagree, tend 
to disagree, tend to agree, or strongly DJUHH´7KLVLVDGXPP\YDULDEOHZLWKDYDOXHRI
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JLYHQWRWKRVHILUPVZKRDJUHHDQGVWURQJO\DJUHHWKDW³WKHFRXUWV\VWHPLVIDLULPSDUWLDO
DQGXQFRUUXSWHG´DQGDYDOXHRIIRUWKRVHZKRGLVDJUHHRUVWURQJO\GLVDJUHe. 
x Corruption composite index: a dummy variable which indicates whether the 
HQWUHSUHQHXUDVVHUWV WKDWDQ LQIRUPDOJLIWRUSD\PHQWZDVH[SHFWHGRU UHTXHVWHG WR³JHW
WKLQJVJRQH´ LQUHODWLRQ WRFXVWRPV WD[HV OLFHQVHVSHUPLWV UHJXODWLRQVDQGVHUYLFHV ,W
takes a value of 1 if the responding entrepreneur reported that this was expected or 
requested in one or more cases, and value 0 otherwise.  
 
3.4.   Other control variables 
To control for other key explanatory variables that may also affect whether a formal 
enterprise witnesses informal sector competition, a series of mostly firm-level variables are 
used. These are derived from past studies of the WBES data (Hudson et al. 2012; Williams 
and Kedir 2017b; Williams et al. 2017) and other studies of entrepreneurship and enterprise 
in the informal sector (Dau and Cuervo-Cazzurra, 2014; Hodosi, 2015; Khan and Quaddus, 
2015; Vu, 2014). These firm-level control variables are: 
x Firm age: a continuous variable indicating the number of years since the firm was 
established. 
x Foreign-owned: DGXPP\YDULDEOHZLWKYDOXHLQGLFDWLQJLIWKHVKDUHRIWKHILUP¶V
ownership held by foreign individuals or enterprises is larger than 49 per cent. 
x Export-orientation: DGXPP\YDULDEOHZLWKYDOXHLQGLFDWLQJWKHSURSRUWLRQRIILUP¶V
sales which are for the export market and 0 for the share of sales for the domestic market. 
x 7RSPDQDJHU¶VH[SHULHQFH, a continuous variable of the years of experience the top 
manager has in the sector; 
x Temporary workers, a variable measuring the average number of temporary workers 
in the firm; 
x Permanent full-time workers, a continuous variable of the average number of 
permanent full-time workers in the firm; 
x Female full-time workers, examining the share of permanent full-time workers that are 
female, and 
x Female involvement in ownership, a dummy variable with value 1 indicating whether 
women are involved in the ownership of the firm and 0 otherwise. 
x Quality certification, a dummy variable with value 1 indicating the firm has an 
internationally-recognized certification and 0 otherwise;  
x External auditor, a dummy variable with value 1 indicating the firm has its annual 
financial statement reviewed by an external auditor and 0 otherwise; 
x Presence of a website, a dummy variable with value 1 when the firm uses a website 
for business related activities and 0 otherwise, and  
x Use of e-mail, a dummy variable with value 1 when a firm uses e-mail to interact with 
clients and suppliers and 0 otherwise.  
x Firm size: a categorical variable with value with value 1 for small firms with less than 
20 employees, value 2 for medium size firms between 20 and 99 employees, and value 3 
for large firms with more than 100 employees. 
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x Legal status: a categorical variable indicating whether the legal form of the firm is an 
open shareholding, a closed shareholding, a sole proprietorship, a partnership, a limited 
partnership, or any other form. 
Table 2 summarizes the variables described above. 
 
Table 2. Summary statistics 
Variables  Obs Mean Std Min Max 
Informal competition 16445 65.47 47.55 0 100 
Ln (GDP per capita) 25587 9.15 0.45 8.15 10.30 
Ln (Household consumption expenditure 
per capita) 21598 7.97 0.57 6.54 9.45 
Expense of government as a percentage of 
GDP 25587 26.06 6.74 14.53 39.43 
Tax revenue to GDP ratio 16170 16.01 4.07 10.44 28.26 
Corruption 21696 14.73 10.35 0 58.11 
Trust 25587 0.25 0.44 0 1 
Firm age 25243 23.53 18.99 0 195 
Exporter  25587 15.05 35.76 0 100 
Foreign ownership 25072 11.43 31.82 0 100 
Top manager experience 24811 21.49 11.99 0 60 
Temporary worker 24856 8.87 32.22 0 900 
Permanent full-time worker 25319 88.22 217.42 0 4585 
Female full-time worker  20443 34.46 26.29 0 100 
Female ownership share 23991 36.52 48.15 0 100 
Quality certification  24716 20.95 40.70 0 100 
External auditor 25238 55.82 49.66 0 100 
Website  25508 54.02 49.84 0 100 
E-mail 25544 85.82 34.88 0 100 
 
3.5.   Methods 
To evaluate the determinants of whether formal enterprises witness informal sector 
competition across the Latin American & Caribbean countries, probit estimate techniques 
are employed. To test the four hypotheses H1-H4, the probit equation used here is: 
0 0i iI HD E H   i iX ȕ  
where iI represents whether formal enterprises state that they witness informal sector 
competition, 0D denotes the constant term, H represents the variables in terms of different 
hypotheses H1-H4, iX denotes a vector of exogenous variables capturing firm-level 
characteristics and, the error term iH  is normally distributed with zero mean and constant 
variance.  
 
4.   Findings: Explaining Cross-Country Variations in Informal Sector 
Competition 
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The finding is that 65.5 per cent of the formal enterprises surveyed in these Latin American 
& Caribbean countries report that they witness informal sector competition. And the extent 
varies from different countries. Table 3 provides an analysis of the varying extent to which 
formal sector enterprises witness informal sector competition across these 31 Latin 
American & Caribbean countries. This reveals that the proportion of formal enterprises 
reporting that they witness informal sector competition ranges from 86 per cent in 
Suriname and 82 per cent in Bolivia to 11 per cent in Dominica and 23 per cent in St Lucia.  
 
Table 3. Cross-national variations in the prevalence of informal sector competition 
Country  Percentage Country  Percentage 
Suriname 86 Jamaica 65 
Bolivia 82 Ecuador 65 
Antigua & Barbuda 77 Belize 64 
Uruguay 75 Mexico 64 
Paraguay 75 St Kitts and Nevis 62 
Costa Rica 73 Honduras 61 
Dominican Republic 73 Guyana 60 
Grenada 73 St Vincent & the Grenadines 59 
Colombia 72 Bahamas 56 
Peru 72 Barbados 53 
Guatemala 71 Panama 52 
Argentina 69 Chile 51 
El Salvador 69 Venezuela 36 
Trinidad & Tobago 67 St Lucia 23 
Nicaragua 66 Dominica 11 
Brazil 66 Average 66 
 
How, therefore, can such marked cross-country variations be explained? Is it the case as 
the modernization thesis suggests that cross-country variations are associated with the level 
of economic development, or is the case that these cross-country variations are associated 
with too much or too little state intervention as the neo-liberal and political economy 
theories respectively assert? Or alternatively is it the case that cross-country variations are 
associated with the differing degrees of asymmetry between formal and informal 
institutions across countries? 
Table 4 below evaluates the likelihood of a formal enterprise stating that it witnesses 
informal sector competition across the Latin American and Caribbean countries. Model 1 
reports the basic probit coefficient estimates of the probability of a formal enterprise 
witnessing informal sector competition using only the firm-level variables. This reveals 
that the effect of firm age is significant and positive, with older firms being more likely to 
witness informal sector competition than younger firms. Meanwhile, formal enterprises 
that are export-oriented and foreign-owned are significantly less likely to witness informal 
sector competition than non-exporting and domestic-owned enterprises. This is doubtless 
because the former is more likely to operate in relatively different market segments to 
informal sector enterprises. Examining workforce characteristics, if the top manager has 
greater experience of working in the sector, this is positively and significantly associated 
with informal sector competition, perhaps indicating that they are in a relatively 
advantageous position of detecting and dealing with such competition. Enterprises more 
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likely to employ permanent full-time and female workers, furthermore, are more likely to 
witness informal sector competition, as are enterprises where women are involved in the 
ownership of the formal enterprise. Analyzing technology, formal enterprises with quality 
certification are less likely to witness informal sector competition. Akin to other studies 
(Galiani and Weinschelbaum, 2012; Kanbur, 2015), firm size is negatively associated with 
the likelihood of witnessing informal sector competition. The operations of small firms are 
more likely to be constrained by informal sector competitors than medium- and larger-
sized enterprises. Finally, with respect to the legal status of firms, no association is 
identified with whether enterprises witness informal sector competition. 
 
Table 4 Probit model of informal sector competition, Latin American & Caribbean 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Ln (GDP per capita)  -0.168*** (0.030)     
Household 
consumption 
expenditure per capita 
  
-0.195*** 
(0.029)    
Tax revenue to GDP 
ratio    
-0.034*** 
(0.003)   
Expense of government 
as a percentage of GDP     
-0.012*** 
(0.002)  
Corruption      0.439*** (0.140) 
Trust -0.209*** 
(0.027) 
-0.179*** 
(0.028) 
-0.194*** 
(0.028) 
-0.145*** 
(0.032) 
-0.195*** 
(0.027) 
-0.197*** 
(0.029) 
Firm characteristics       
Firm age 0.003*** 
(0.000) 
0.003*** 
(0.000) 
0.003*** 
(0.000) 
0.003*** 
(0.000) 
0.003*** 
(0.000) 
0.003*** 
(0.000) 
Exporter  -0.003*** 
(0.000) 
-0.003*** 
(0.000) 
-0.003*** 
(0.000) 
-0.004*** 
(0.000) 
-0.003*** 
(0.000) 
-0.003***  
(0.000) 
Foreign ownership -0.003*** 
(0.000) 
-0.003*** 
(0.000) 
-0.003*** 
(0.000) 
-0.003*** 
(0.000) 
-0.003*** 
(0.000) 
-0.003***  
(0.000) 
Workforce       
Top manager 
experience 
0.004*** 
(0.001) 
0.004*** 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.002* 
(0.001) 
0.003*** 
(0.001) 
0.003***  
(0.001) 
Temporary worker 0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000  
(0.000) 
Permanent full-time 
worker 
0.000* 
(0.000) 
0.000*** 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000* 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
Female full-time worker  0.003*** 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.003*** 
(0.000) 
0.003*** 
(0.000) 
0.003*** 
(0.000) 
0.000*** 
(0.000) 
Female ownership share 0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000** 
(0.000) 
0.000** 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
Technology       
Quality certification  -0.003*** 
(0.000) 
-0.003*** 
(0.000) 
-0.004*** 
(0.000) 
-0.002*** 
(0.000) 
-0.003*** 
(0.000) 
-0.001*** 
(0.000) 
External auditor -0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
Website  -0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
E-mail 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 
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(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Firm size       
Medium  -0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000* 
(0.018) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.013) 
Large  -0.001*** 
(0.000) 
-0.002*** 
(0.000) 
-0.001*** 
(0.000) 
-0.002*** 
(0.000) 
-0.002*** 
(0.000) 
-0.002*** 
(0.000) 
Legal status       
Closed shareholding -0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
Sole proprietor  0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
Partnership  0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
Limited partnership  0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
Other legal status  -0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
0.00 
(0.045) 
Sector dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Constant 0.298*** 
(0.070) 
1.817*** 
(0.285) 
1.856*** 
(0.239) 
0.878*** 
(0.106) 
0.579*** 
(0.086) 
0.235*** 
(0.077) 
Pseudo R-squared 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.04 
N 11,790 11,790 8,966 8,305 11,790 11,031 
SourceDXWKRUV¶FDOFXODWLRQVIURP:RUOG%DQN(QWHUSULVH6XUYH\:%(6GDWDVHW 
 
The remaining models then add the key country-level variables to these firm-level variables 
in a staged manner to examine their influence. To evaluate the validity of modernization 
theory, model 2 adds the country-level indicator of the log of GDP per capita and shows a 
significant negative association. The higher the log of GDP per capita, the lower is the 
probability that formal enterprises will witness informal sector competition (confirming 
H1a). Similarly, model 3 evaluates log of household consumption expenditure per capita 
and finds that the higher is the household consumption expenditure per capita, the lower is 
the probability of formal enterprises witnessing informal sector competition (confirming 
H1b). These two models therefore confirm the modernization thesis (H1). Importantly, 
moreover, the significances and signs of all the firm-level variables in model 1 remain the 
same when these country-level variables are added in models 2 and 3. This also applies in 
the case of all remaining models that add country-level variables associated with the 
remaining theoretical explanations.  
Testing the neo-liberal thesis (H2) and political economy thesis (H3) that the operations 
of formal enterprises are more likely to witness informal sector competition when there is 
too much or too little state intervention respectively, model 4 examines tax revenue to GDP 
ratio and model 5 the expense of government as a percentage of GDP. The finding in model 
4 is that there is a negative association between tax revenue to GDP ratio and the likelihood 
of formal enterprises witnessing informal sector competition (refuting H2a but confirming 
H3a). Model 5 similarly finds a negative association between the expense of government 
as a percentage of GDP and the likelihood of formal enterprises witnessing informal sector 
competition (refuting H2b but confirming H3b). The outcome is that an association 
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between too little state intervention and the probability for formal enterprises witnessing 
informal sector competitors in Latin American and Caribbean countries (refuting H2 but 
confirming H3).   
Meanwhile, as a test of whether formal enterprises are more likely to witness informal 
sector competition when there is asymmetry between the laws and regulations of formal 
institutions and the norms, values and beliefs of entrepreneurs, all models examine the level 
of trust of entrepreneurs in institutions, measured by whether they perceive the court 
system as fair, impartial and uncorrupted. There is strong significant negative association 
between trust in formal institutions (measured by whether the court system is viewed as 
fair, impartial and uncorrupted) and the likelihood of formal enterprises witnessing 
informal sector competition; the lower the trust in formal institutions, the greater is the 
probability that formal enterprises will witness informal sector competition (confirming 
H4a). It is similarly the case that when corruption is taken as a further proxy indicator of 
the existence of vertical trust (i.e., symmetry between the formal and informal institutions), 
model 6 again reveals a significant correlation between corruption and the likelihood of 
formal enterprises witnessing informal sector competition. The greater the likelihood of an 
entrepreneur asserting that an informal gift or payment is expected or requested to get 
things done, the greater is the likelihood of a formal enterprise asserting that they witness 
informal sector competition (confirming H4b). The outcome is that there is a significant 
correlation between institutional asymmetry and the likelihood of informal sector 
competition (confirming H4).   
 
5.   Discussion and Conclusions 
Evaluating WBES data collected in 31 Latin American & Caribbean countries between 
2006 and 2010, the finding is that two-thirds (65.5 per cent) of formal enterprises state that 
they witness informal sector competition. To explain these cross-country variations, a 
probit regression analysis has revealed that beyond economic under-development, it is too 
little state intervention that leads to greater informal sector competition and the non-
alignment of the laws and regulations with the norms, values and beliefs of entrepreneurs. 
Here, therefore, the theoretical and policy implications are discussed. (our findings confirm 
three views, so discussion parts should be rewrite.) 
 Theoretically, this reveals the need to transcend the use of singular theories when 
explaining variations in the commonality of informal sector competition. These theories 
are not mutually exclusive. Instead, if cross-country variations in the prevalence of 
informal sector competition are to be more fully understood, there is a need to combine the 
modernization, political economy theory and institutional theories. The propensity of 
formal enterprises to witness informal sector competitors is greater in countries where there 
is a lower level of economic development, too little government intervention and the level 
of institutional asymmetry is higher.  
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 This finding has implications for how the informal sector is tackled. Conventionally, 
the dominant policy approach of governments has been for the enforcement bodies, such 
as the tax and labour enforcement authorities, to ensure that the cost of being caught and 
punished is greater than the pay-off from participating in the informal sector (Allingham 
and Sandmo, 1972). 7KLVKDVEHHQDFKLHYHGODUJHO\E\XVLQJ³VWLFNV¶ZKLFKLQFUHDVHWKH
costs and likelihood of being caught by increasing the fines and/or perceived or actual 
probability of detection. Recently, furthermore, more attention has been paid to altering the 
cost/EHQHILWUDWLRE\LPSURYLQJWKHEHQHILWVRIIRUPDOLVDWLRQXVLQJ³FDUURWV´LQFHQWLYHVWR
encourage formal sector entrepreneurship (Matthias et al., 2014).   
 As this paper displays, nevertheless, when tax and labour enforcement authorities alter 
the costs of informality and the benefits of formalisation, they are merely dealing with the 
effects of the problem. They are not tackling the structural economic and social conditions 
that determine the level of informal sector competition. Formal enterprises will be less 
constrained by informal sector competition only if there is a higher level of economic 
development, more state intervention and greater symmetry between the laws and 
regulations introduced by formal institutions and the norms, values and beliefs of 
entrepreneurs.  The latter can be addressed by changing the norms, values and beliefs of 
entrepreneurs using education and awareness raising initiatives about the benefits of 
formality and disadvantages of informality. However, in many countries, it is unlikely that 
these informal institutions will change unless there are alterations in the formal institutions. 
This requires firstly, greater procedural fairness so that entrepreneurs believe they are 
paying their fair share compared with others (Molero and Pujol, 2012), secondly, greater 
procedural justice, in order that entrepreneurs believe they are being treated by  the 
authorities in a responsible, respectful and impartial way (Murphy, 2005) and third and 
finally, greater redistributive justice in order that entrepreneurs perceive themselves to be 
receiving the goods and services they deserve for the taxes they pay (Kirchgässner, 2010).  
 Despite revealing some strong associations between the level of informal sector 
competition and various structural conditions, limitations nevertheless exist in relation to 
what can be concluded, and caveats are required. A first limitation of this study is that 
informal sector enterprise and entrepreneurship has been examined only through the lens 
of whether formal enterprises witness informal sector competition. The problem is that this 
cross-country enterprise survey has not defined for respondents what is meant by informal 
sector competition. Respondents may thus interpret registration in multifarious ways (e.g., 
whethHUDQHQWHUSULVHLVUHJLVWHUHGXQGHUIDFWRULHV¶RUFRPPHUFLDODFWVZKHWKHULWSRVVHVVHV
DORFDOWUDGLQJOLFHQVHZKHWKHULWLVUHJLVWHUHGXQGHUSURIHVVLRQDOJURXSV¶UHJXODWRU\DFWV
especially across sectors, and across different countries. Secondly, this WBES survey only 
evaluates the prevalence of informal sector competition through the lens of formal 
enterprises employing five or more employees. It does not ask micro-enterprises and sole 
traders whether they are constrained by informal sector competition. Given that this paper 
reveals that smaller enterprises are more likely to witness informal sector competition, the 
levels of informal sector competition reported may be an under-estimate. Future cross-
country surveys, therefore, should survey micro-enterprises and sole traders.   
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 To conclude, despite these shortcomings, this paper has made theoretical advances in 
explaining informal sector entrepreneurship by revealing that it is not only too little state 
intervention, as political economy theory argues, but also whether the laws and regulations 
introduced are in symmetry with the norms, values and beliefs of entrepreneurs, as 
institutional theory asserts, along with the level of economic development, as 
modernization theory contends, that influences the level of informal sector competition. If 
this now leads to governments paying greater attention to these structural determinants 
ZKHQWDFNOLQJLQIRUPDOVHFWRUFRPSHWLWLRQUDWKHUWKDQVLPSO\XVLQJ³VWLFNV´DQG³FDUURWV´
to deal with the effects, then this paper will have fulfilled its intention.  
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